A New SS#s for Your Adopted Child and How to Protect Your Child's Credit

The Social Security Administration (SSA) has made some exciting changes in the last year. Previously, it was very difficult to change a child's social security number after adoption, leaving the child at risk for identify fraud. While the name on the card was changed after adoption to reflect the child's new name, the number typically remained the same. Now, however, it's just a matter of requesting the change, and providing the necessary documentation to the SSA.

To be issued a new number, the child must be under the age of 18. A parent must take their adoption decree and their child's new birth certificate to their local SSA office. If the child is 12 or older, the child must accompany the parent to the office.  

It's important to ask your adoption attorney for a copy of the SSA's new policy,  so you can take it with you to the SSA in the event the clerk is unfamiliar with the policy change.    

Another way to protect your child from identity fraud is to place a freeze on the child's credit. For information on how to do this, please go to  How to Freeze Your Child's Credit

Stepparent Adoption

By Debra M. Finch, Esq.

Debra M. Finch, PC

A child advocacy and adoption law firm

In my practice I represent a large number of stepparents who wish to adopt his/her stepchild.  Other than the custodial parent,  the stepparent is often the only other parent the child has known. A stepparent may have a close relationship to the child, although no biological relationship.  Legal guidance is often sought out of concern over what might happen to the child upon the death of the custodial parent.  When a custodial parent dies, custody of the child normally goes to the surviving parent.  The stepparent has no legal rights to his/her stepchild. The child may be thrust into an unfamiliar and unstable situation with his or her surviving parent or other relatives, instead of remaining with a familiar stepparent with whom the child shares a bond.  To prevent such an outcome, a stepparent, with the consent of his/her spouse, may opt to file for a stepparent adoption. 

Among other things, a stepparent adoption requires the consent of the stepparent's spouse. If the child is 14 years or older, it requires the consent of the child. The stepparent must be fingerprinted (as do all petitioners for adoption in Georgia); however, whether a home evaluation is required is in the court's discretion.  The petitioner's attorney may ask the court to waive the evaluation, and often a court will in the case of a stepparent adoption.

A parent may surrender his or her parental rights in favor of the stepparent adoption, or the Court may terminate his/her parental rights, after a hearing, based on certain criteria,which may include failure to support the child in the year prior to petitioning for adoption, failure to communicate with the child in a meaningful way in the year prior to petitioning for adoption, abandonment of the child, death of the non-custodial parent, or a parent's failure or inability to properly parent the child. The Court must also find that termination of parental rights is based on clear and convincing evidence (a high evidentiary standard), and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests. 

The parent must be notified of the filing of the stepparent's adoption petition.  The type of notice to the parent depends on whether he or she is a legal parent or not. To determine whether a parent is a legal parent or not depends on a myriad of circumstances (i.e., whether or not the child's parents were married when child was born; whether or not the child was legitimated at birth or thereafter, etc.).  An adoption law attorney will be able to advise you on whether a parent is a legal parent or not under Georgia law and what type of notice must be provided to him/her. (Not providing adequate or proper notice to a parent could place the adoption in jeopardy)

Upon the granting of a stepparent adoption, the stepparent has the same legal rights and obligations to the child as if the child were born to him/her, including rights of inheritance, duty of support, etc.  In the event of divorce, the former stepparent (now parent) will have an obligation to support the child and could seek custodial rights superior to that of his/her spouse.

After the adoption, a  new birth certificate will issue which may change the child's name and which will list the adoptive parent as the child's parent, along with his/her spouse. There will be no mention of the parent whose rights were terminated.  

Stepparent adoption is often legal validation of the bond and relationship between a stepparent and child. If you are interested in stepparent adoption, please consult a qualified adoption attorney who can advise you based on your circumstances and Georgia law. 

No Injury, No Harm, so says Georgia Supreme Court

By Debra M. Finch, Esq.

Debra M. Finch, PC

A child advocacy and adoption law firm

Does an offender commit intentional physical harm to a child when he touches a child in a sexual manner but does not cause physical pain or injury to the child?

In a recent decision, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled no injury, no harm, resulting in the removal of a convicted child molester from the state’s sex offender registry.[1]

In 1993, Blake Randle pled guilty to one count of child molestation. He was sentenced to three years in prison for touching the penis of a ten-year-old boy.  After completing his prison sentence, Mr. Randle registered as a sex offender.[2]

Ten years after completing his sentence, Mr. Randle was eligible to petition for removal from the registry provided he met certain other criteria: 1) no prior convictions for sexual offenses or obscenity in relation to minors; 2) the offense did not involve use of a deadly weapon; 3) no evidence of similar transactions; 4) offense did not involve the transportation of the victim; 5) the victim was not physically restrained; and 6) the victim did not suffer any intentional physical harm during the commission of the offense.[3]

In Randle, the case turned on the definition of “intentional physical harm”. The State argued that because Mr. Randle’s underlying sexual offense involved physical contact with the genitals of a child, it created a presumption of “intentional physical harm”. 

           

The Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument, ruling that the legislature distinguishes “insulting or provoking physical contact” from intentional “physical harm”. Physical harm, the Court said, involves infliction of pain or physical injury.   Because the child victim in the Randle case did not suffer physical harm, Mr. Randle, a convicted child molester, met the criteria for removal from the registry.

Common sense dictates that physical wounds often heal much faster than psychological wounds. While a victim may not suffer intentional “physical harm” during the commission of sexual assault, he or she may suffer severe psychological injuries that never heal, especially if the victim is a child.  

Victims of sexual assault, particularly child victims, deserve better treatment under Georgia law. 

The criteria for removal from the registry should be amended to create a presumption of intentional physical harm when a child is the victim of a sexual assault.  It should also require a showing that the victim (adult or child) was not threatened with physical harm during the assault and did not suffer severe psychological injury as a result of the assault.   Even in the absence of a deadly weapon, the threats employed by some offenders against their victims, especially child victims, are often as effective as use of an actual deadly weapon.

The Randle decision illustrates flaws in how physical harm is defined as it relates to child victims and removal of offenders from the registry. Hopefully, the legislature will see fit to correct it.

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[1] State v. Randle, Georgia Supreme Court, S15G094 (1/19/2016).

[2] The registration system is designed to monitor and track sex offenders in the community. It is used by the public and by law enforcement.

[3] See O.C.G.A. 42-1-19 and O.C.G.A. 17-10-6.2 (c).